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REFERENDUM REZONING
little sense if the ultimate goal is to protect these plans and ensure their
survival.
The issue in the Williams case is a close one and perhaps should
receive specific congressional attention; in the absence of more illumi-
nating congressional guidance, however, encouragement of pension and
profit-sharing plans and the preservation of their integrity demand a
judicial definition of "payment" that includes promissory notes within
its ambit-a broader definition than that adhered to for almost thirty
years by the Tax Court and, more recently, by the Seventh Circuit.
Admittedly this result would have to be achieved at the expense of a
strict statutory construction; however, this broader definition of "pay-
ment" would be tempered by an inquiry into the underlying worth of
the notes as suggested by the Slaymaker-Sachs approach. This result
would encourage more corporations to adopt or retain pension plans,
which is, after all, the basic purpose of section 404(a).
ALLEN T. WOOD III
Zoning -Adjudication by Labels: Referendum Rezoning and
Due Process
In recent years, the use of procedural devices providing for direct
citizen participation' in land use planning decisions has proliferated.2
The use of these devices to regulate change in land use patterns pre-
viously established by zoning ordinances 3 has given rise to due process
1. Popular participation is facilitated by the availability of two devices: the ini-
tiative and the referendum. The initiative permits citizens to legislate directly by having
a proposed measure placed on the ballot and submitted to a popular vote. The referen-
dum permits citizens to have measures already approved by a legislative body submitted
to voter review. The operation of these devices is usually conditioned on the receipt
of appropriate petitions requesting the particular initiative or referendum. Comment,
The Initiative and Referendum's Use in Zoning, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 74, 74 nn.1 & 2
(1976).
2. See, e.g., City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204, 439 P.2d 290
(1968); San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d
570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974), appeal dismissed, 96 S. Ct. 3184 (1976); Associated
Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 41 Cal. App. 3d 677, 116 Cal. Rptr. 326 (Ct. App.
1974); West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974); Bird v. Soren-
son, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964).
3. Land use restrictions imposed by a local zoning ordinance can be altered by
the use of three procedures. When the application of zoning restrictions to a particular
1977] 517
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challenges attacking such popular participation as an arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of the police power. The United States
Supreme Court had not addressed itself to this issue in almost fifty
years,4 and its early decisions did not provide a meaningful due process
test. In Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.5 the Court confronted
the question whether the imposition of a mandatory" referendum proc-
ess on those seeking amendment of a comprehensive zoning ordinance
was such an unreasonable exercise. 7  In upholding the referendum re-
quirement by relying on state law and by reciting rather than analyzing
the relevant federal precedent, the Court failed to provide a more pre-
cise due process measure of constitutionality. The decision strongly
suggests, however, that rezoning by referendum will be upheld against
similar future challenges, even when there is little or no support in the
record to justify community-wide decisionmaking.
Plaintiff8 in Eastlake brought suit in the Ohio Court of Common
Pleas to challenge the constitutionality9 of a newly enacted provision
parcel is unusually harsh, a variance may be obtained from a local administrative body
to waive or alter the restriction. 5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAw § 129.02
(1975). Also, a local ordinance may provide that certain uses, while not permitted as
of right, may be allowed by special permit upon the approval of a local administrative
body. The administrative body must evaluate the proposal according to specified criteria
not necessarily related to hardship. Id. § 148.01. In addition, the zoning ordinance
itself may be amended. Id. § 147.01. The initiative and referendum cannot be utilized
to affect the availability of variances or special permits. The grant or denial of a re-
quest for a variance or special permit is an administrative act; the initiative and referen-
dum are restricted in application to powers vested in the legislative body. See, e.g., note
20 infra.
4. Until this year, the Court's most recent statement was to be found in Washing-
ton ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
5. 96 S. Ct. 2358 (1976).
6. The referendum provision involved in Eastlake is atypical in that the require-
ment of voter review is applied to an entire class of legislation, thereby obviating the
need for gathering petitions to combat a legislatively approved amendment. See note
12 infra.
7. 96 S. Ct. at 2362-63. The court below stated the claim as follows: "[A]p-
pellant's narrow claim is that Eastlake's charter provision constitutes a delegation of leg-
islative power to the people, and as such violates the requirement that the police powers
be exercised in a reasonable and unarbitrary fashion." Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v.
City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 191, 324 N.E.2d 740, 744 (1975) (emphasis
added).
8. Plaintiff was an Ohio corporation and the owner of an eight acre parcel of
land situated in the city of Eastlake, Ohio. 96 S. Ct. at 2360.
9. Challenges were made on both state and federal constitutional grounds. In ad-
dition to the fourteenth amendment claim, plaintiff asserted that the ordinance was in
violation of the referendum provisions of OHIo CONST. of 1851, art. II, § 1(f) (1912).
Plaintiff also challenged the requirement of 55% voter approval, the requirement of
having to bear the costs of the referendum, and the applicability of the referendum pro-
vision (which had been incorporated into the city charter only after its application for
rezoning) to his request. 96 S. Ct. at 2361 nn.2-4.
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of the Eastlake city charter'" that required that plaintiffs request for
rezoning" its property be submitted to a city-wide referendum after city
council approval of the proposed change. 12 Both the court of common
pleas and the Ohio Court of Appeals sustained the validity of the ordi-
nance against the due process challenge. 3
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed. After finding that the type
of rezoning requested by plaintiff was a legislative function under Ohio
law, 14 the court interpreted a line of United States Supreme Court due
process cases from the early 1900's 5 -to mean that "[a] reasonable use
of property, made possible by appropriate legislative action, may not
be made dependent upon the potentially arbitrary and unreasonable
whims of the voting public."' Applying this test, the court found that
the charter provision "blatantly delegated legislative authority"'-7 in
contravention of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 8
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed,' 9 up-
holding the constitutionality of the charter provision on three grounds.
10. EASTLAKE, OHIO CHARTER art. VIII, § 3 (1971), quoted in 96 S. Ct. at 2368
n.8.
11. Plaintiff had requested that its parcel be rezoned from industrial to multi-
family, high-rise residential use. 96 S. Ct. at 2360; 41 Ohio St. 2d at 187, 324 N.E.2d
at 742.
12. The new ordinance provides in pertinent part:
[Any change to the existing land uses or any change whatsoever to any or-
dinance, or the enactment of any ordinance referring to other regulations con-
trolling the development of land . . . cannot be approved unless and until it
shall have been submitted to the Planning Commission, for approval or disap-
proval. That in the event the city council should approve any of the preceding
changes, or enactments . . . it shall not be approved or passed by the declara-
tion of an emergency, and it shall not be effective, but it shall be mandatory
that the same be approved by a 55% favorable vote of all votes cast of the
qualified electors of the City of Eastlake ....
96 S. Ct. at 2368 n.8.
13. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 188, 324 N.E.2d at 742. The Court of Common Pleas struck
the cost-bearing provision. Defendant did not appeal this holding to the state supreme
court, and plaintiff did not appeal the rejection of its contention that the ordinance could
not be applied to its particular request. Id.
14. Id. at 189-90, 324 N.E.2d at 743.
15. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928);
Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); Eubank v. City of Rich-
mond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912). The latter two are discussed in text accompanying notes
31-42 infra.
16. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 195, 324 N.E.2d at 746.
17. Id. at 196, 324 N.E.2d at 746.
18. Assuming that the Ohio Supreme Court properly interpreted the due process
line of cases cited in note 15 supra, the result it reached does not necessarily follow.
Since the charter had been amended before the city council approved plaintiff's rezoning
proposal, it is arguable that the council action never "made possible" the land use pro-
posed, but rather that it only "made possible" the necessity of a referendum.
19. Justices Brennan, Powell and Stevens dissented.
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First, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, interpreted the
Ohio Constitution as reserving, rather than delegating, to the citi-
zens of Ohio the referendum power over legislative affairs. 20 There
having been no delegation of power, the Court reasoned, there was no
delegation in violation of the due process clause.2 Second, the Court
accepted as binding for the purpose of its due .process analysis the
finding of the Ohio court that the rezoning process at bar was legislative
in nature22 and summarily concluded that the only due process doctrine
available to plaintiff was that of freedom from an unreasonable zoning
classification, as opposed to freedom from an unreasonable procedure
for obtaining a (new) classification.2 Finally, the Court distinguished
the "standardless delegation of power" struck down in the due process
cases relied on by the Ohio court from the Eastlake referendum process
and its concomitant virtues. 4 While borrowing language from two
recent federal decisions25 to support this latter distinction, the Court
failed to provide any factual analysis to demonstrate comparability be-
tween the case at bar and the cases it cited.
In dissent, Justice Stevens 20 ignored the delegation of power issue
entirely, arguing instead that the decision whether to rezone27 a par-
ticular parcel of land is, absent some evidence in the record of a po-
tential for community-wide impact, adjudicative in nature.2 8 He
20. OHIO CONsT. art. II, § l(f) provides in part: 'The initiative and referendum
are hereby reserved to the people of each municipality on all questions which such mu-
nicipality may now or hereafter be authorized by law to control by legislative action
21. 96 S. Ct. at 2363. Although the language of art. II, § l(f), quoted in note
20 supra, does suggest this interpretation, see Note, Mandatory Referendum for Zoning
Amendments-Unlawful Delegation of Legislative Power-Denial of Due Process, 9
AxRON L. REv. 175, 183 (1975), it is arguable that the Ohio Supreme Court implicitly
rejected this conclusion in its finding that a delegation had occurred. 41 Ohio St. 2d
at 196, 324 N.E.2d at 746.
22. 96 S. Ct. at 2362.
23. Id. at 2363 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
24. 96 S. Ct. at 2364-65.
25. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking
Org. v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970). The latter is discussed in text ac-
companying notes 55-61 infra.
26. Justice Brennan joined with Justice Stevens in dissent. Justice Powell wrote
a separate dissenting opinion.
27. Both Justice Stevens and the Chief Justice relied heavily on state court deci-
sions to support their respective legislative/non-legislative dichotomies. 96 S. Ct. at
2362, 2366, 2370. The significant distinction between the two views is that Justice
Stevens would categorize according to the prospective impact of the rezoning, id. at 2371,
while Chief Justice Burger would take a formalistic approach, adopting as controlling
the state law determination, id. at 2362.
28. "I have no doubt about the validity of the initiative or the referendum as an
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asserted that this conclusion should result regardless of the "legislative"
label affixed to the activity by the state court.29  Justice Stevens con-
cluded that as an adjudicative mechanism, the referendum is an inap-
propriate device for disposition of the rezoning request because of its
inherent inability to afford the applicant requisite procedural
safeguards.a0
Plaintiff's due process claim arose out of a line of Supreme Court
cases starting with Eubank v. City of Richmond.3 In Eubank the
Court invalidated a city ordinance that permitted a limited number of
neighboring property owners to mandate, by petition, the establishment
of a building line, a line beyond which the owner could not build, on
a specific parcel. 32 The unreasonableness of the ordinance, the Court
found, rested in the ability of a few persons to exercise unchecked
"control" over the property rights of another, control that might be
occasioned by selfishness or whimsy.3" The transfer of land use
planning authority to area residents was thus stricken because of the
small number of residents who could selfishly impose restrictions-an
arrangement that has been disparagingly termed "an expression of
neighborhood preference for restraints."34
Five years after Eubank, the Court decided Thomas Cusack Co.
v. City of Chicago," which added another dimension to the due process
analysis. In Cusack the Court upheld a city ordinance that permitted
a percentage of neighboring property owners to waive a billboard ban
previously imposed by another provision of that ordinance.36 Re-
sponding to plaintiff's assertion that Eubank was controlling precedent,
the Court distinguished the neighborhood imposition of land use prohibi-
tions from the neighborhood removal (or waiver) of such prohibitions."
appropriate method of deciding questions of community policy. I think it is equally
clear that the popular vote is not an acceptable method of adjudicating the rights of in-
dividual litigants." Id. at 2371.
29. Id. at 2368.
30. These safeguards include a resolution "on the merits by reference to articulable
rules" as well as an "impartial and qualified" decisionmaker. Id. at 2371.
31. 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
32. Id. at 141.
33. Id. at 144.
34. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291, 294
(9th Cir. 1970).
35. 242 U.S. 526 (1917).
36. Id. at 527-28.
37. The former left the establishment of the building line untouched until the
lot owners should act and then made the street committee the mere automatic
register of that action and gave to it the effect of law. The ordinance in the
case at bar absolutely prohibits the erection of billboards . . . but permits this
1977]
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After Cusack then, both the nature of popular participation-
waiver or imposition of restraints-and the number of persons allowed
to participate are relevant due process concerns. Substantial tension
exists, however, between these two factors. While the Eubank Court
decried the potential for selfishness under the building line ordinance,
the Cusack Court in upholding the billboard ordinance allowed such
selfishness to prevail.3 8 Furthermore, the ordinance in Eubank was
viewed as an unreasonable exercise of the city's police power in part
because of the city-wide inconsistency in land use policy that would
result. 9 There is nothing to suggest less inconsistent results from the
exercise of neighborhood power under the Cusack procedure.
Cusack may be seen as the pivotal case on the due process issue
raised in Eastlake. To the extent that the imposition-waiver distinction
drawn in Cusack is still good law,40 it could be dispositive, since
plaintiff in Eastlake, like plaintiff in Cusack, was arguably requesting
the removal of a prohibition. 41  To the extent, however, that the
Cusack Court contradicted Eubank by endorsing neighborhood land use
policy-making because neighbors are those most affected, it suggests
that a referendum on such a localized issue would be uniquely inap-
propriate: negotiation is impracticable and those who are affected in
fact may not be able to control the decision.42
The vitality of Eubank and Cusack, however, has been drawn into
question by another line of Supreme Court cases that applied the
prohibition to be modified with the consent of the persons who are to be most
affected by such modification . . . . This is not a delegation of legislative
power, but is . . . a familiar provision affecting the enforcement of laws and
ordinances.
Id. at 531.
38. The concession by the Court that some land use planning decisions are most
appropriately handled on an informal, neighborhood basis suggests that Eubank was
wrongly decided. In both cases the relevant statutory schemes may be seen as providing
a legal framework within which neighborhood negotiation may take place. See Ellick-
son, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Con-
trols, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 681, 709-10 (1973).
39. 226 U.S. at 144.
40. At least one commentator has questioned the vitality of the Cusack holding.
See Comment, supra note 1, at 98-99. See also text accompanying notes 43-54 infra.
41. See note 18 supra.
42. Both the Ohio and United States Supreme Courts included Washington ex rel.
Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928), in the line of early due process
cases. Although both courts treated Roberge, in essence, as an affirmance of the Eu-
bank decision, it is questionable whether the R6berge Court believed itself to be con-
fronted with a similar due process issue. The zoning ordinance challenged by plaintiff
in Roberge was struck down as a denial of due process. 278 U.S. at 122 (citing Eu-
bank). In support of its statement that the ordinance permits constitutionally infirm
motives to enter into neighborhood decisionmaking, however, the Court relied on Yick
[Vol. 55522
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former decisions in analyzing due process challenges to congressional
delegations of authority. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 48 the Court,
citing Eubank as primary authority,44 struck down as an unlawful dele-
gation of legislative authority an act45 that gave a portion of the em-
ployers and employees in a single industry and in a defined district
unchecked authority to set wage and hour standards for the entire in-
dustry in that district by vote. 46  The administrative authority with
oversight responsibility was required to accept -the resulting standards.47
Three years later, in Currin v. Wallace,48 the Court, citing Cusack,
upheld an act 49 that also required industry participation in the regu-
latory process, but that permitted referendum proceedings on specific
decisions only after they were approved by the administrative author-
ity.5" The Court dismissed Carter as precedent, stating: "This is not
a case where a group of producers may make a law and enforce it upon
a minority . . ... 51 In likening the Currin scheme for participation
to the scheme involved in Cusack, the Court attempted to distinguish
the Carter provisions on the basis of Cusack's imposition-waiver
dichotomy. -5 2  But this distinction is unpersuasive since industry partici-
pation was related to imposing restraints on the subject industry in both
Carter and Currin. Rather, the difference rests in the control by the
administrative authority of the alternatives that may be selected by indus-
try vote. In Currin, unlike Carter, industry participation is limited to
the approval of alternatives previously adjudged to be reasonable. 52
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). The ordinance struck down in Yick Wo was held
invalid on equal protection grounds. 118 U.S. at 374. That the Court in Roberge was
in actuality concerned with the particularly harsh treatment accorded the plaintiff is fur-
ther borne out by the language of the ordinance, which appears to single out plaintiff's
particular use for harsher treatment than other uses with which it was grouped before
the ordinance was amended. 278 U.S. at 120 (footnote).
43. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
44. Id. at 311-12.
45. Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, ch. 824, sec. 4, 49 Stat. 991 (1935). One
purpose of this Act was to "stabilize the . . . industry and promote its interstate com-
merce . . ." 298 U.S. at 278.
46. Id. at 283-84.
47. Id.
48. 306 U.S. 1 (1939).
49. Tobacco Inspection Act, ch. 623, sec. 5, 49 Stat. 731 (1935) (current version
at 7 U.S.C. §§ 511-517 (1970)). This Act was designed to bring stability into the inter-
state tobacco market and thereby protect producers. The Act conferred on the Secretary
of Agriculture the power to designate warehouses for tobacco inspection. 306 U.S. at
5-6.
50. Id. at 6.
51. Id. at 15-16.
52. Id. at 15; see text accompanying notes 35-41 supra.
53. Cf. McManus v. CAB, 286 F.2d 414, 419 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 928
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These cases suggest an alternative to the imposition-waiver due
process analysis of Cusack: a "supervised participation," under which
popular participation in land use planning is acceptable, even if use re-
straints result, as long as it is controlled to insure that the decisions
reached are consistent with an externally established policy. The
Eastlake case provided the Supreme Court with an excellent opportuni-
ty to rule on the applicability of supervised participation as an alterna-
tive due process approach in the area of land use decisionmaking and
to delimit the minimum acceptable standards for such practices. 4
In recent years the Supreme Court has twice considered the
constitutionality of mandatory referenda.5 Since both cases involved
equal protection challenges, however, the Court, while speaking favorably
of the referendum as a land use planning device, has not been required to
confront squarely the due process claim raised by plaintiff in Eastlake.
A similar claim did confront the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization [SASSO] v. Union
City."6  In SASSO plaintiffs challenged a permissive 7 referendum
that nullified the rezoning of a parcel that would have permitted the
construction of federally financed low income housing. 8 The cir-
cuit court upheld the validity of the nullifying referendum,59 dis-
tinguishing in broad terms the referendum process from the neighbor-
hood preference cases.00 The court thus adopted the Eubank due proc-
(1961) (administrative authority to disapprove agreements made between industry mem-
bers).
54. Eastlake provides an excellent test case. Under the ordinance, referenda do
not occur until the city council has approved the request; there is thus found the element
of supervision. Council control is limited, however, because the ordinance does not pro.
vide for relief from the referendum process when the present zoning status of the parcel
has become unreasonable due to changed circumstances. Therefore it is not within the
council's supervisory powers to prevent a referendum from defeating what it believes to
be a constitutionally compelled approval of a rezoning request. 96 S. Ct. at 2363; see
note 12 supra. See also Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969); Spaulding v.
Blair, 403 F.2d 862, 864 (4th Cir. 1968).
55. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385
(1969); see text accompanying notes 74-78 infra.
56. 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
57. A permissive referendum, unlike its mandatory counterpart, requires the pres-
entation of a petition, signed by a specified number of qualified persons, for each specific
issue on which a referendum is desired. See, e.g., id. at 293 n.3. There may be signifi-
cant differences in terms of due process between a permissive and a mandatory referen-
dum procedure. See Comment, supra note 1, at 98. This distinction, however, was
overlooked by the Supreme Court in the Eastlake decision.
58. 424 F.2d at 291.
59. Appellants in SASSO also mounted an unsuccessful equal protection challenge
to the referendum. Id. at 295-96.
60. Id. at 294.
[Vol. 55
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ess measure-the number of persons participating-but ignored the
Cusack waiver-imposition distinction as well as the supervised partici-
pation approach from the Carter and Currin cases, under either of
which the permissive referendum might not have fared so well.6
Against this backdrop of multiple, and arguably conflicting, due
process tests for the constitutionality of direct citizen participation in
land use planning, the majority opinion in Eastlake is analytically
inconclusive. Chief Justice Burger placed primary reliance on his
interpretation of the Ohio Constitution to dispose of the Ohio Supreme
Court's contention that an unlawful delegation occured under the
Eastlake ordinance. 62 This interpretation provided the Court with a
vehicle for disposing of the case without delimiting the utility or
vitality of the various available due process tests.
The concept of supervised participation was the first test with
which the Court attempted to deal. Responding to the Ohio Supreme
Court's contention that the ordinance provided for inadequate
legislative (council) control,63 Chief Justice Burger did take note of
federal court decisions concerned with congressional delegations to
other authorities.64 However, the cases to which he turned did not
involve statutory requirements that make the implementation of policy
decisions subject to approval by non-governmental persons, as was the
case in Currin. Rather, the cases cited dealt more narrowly with the
ability of the delegate itself to prescribe policy within definable
boundaries. 65
The majority, however, did provide more relevant commentary
that evinces a pessimistic perspective on the quality of legislative super-
vision that would ensue, were such supervision required. Stating that
requiring supervision as a matter of due process "sweeps too broadly"
because the legislative body and the voters are equally likely to misap-
ply or ignore appropriate standards,66 the Court appears to have elimi-
61. Since a permissive referendum is not operative until after the rezoning request
is granted, it is more clearly an attempt to (re-)impose a land use restraint than a ref-
erendum that is attached by statute to any rezoning approval. See note 18 supra.
62. See text accompanying notes 14-21 supra.
63. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 196, 324
N.E.2d 740, 746 (1975).
64. 96 S. Ct. at 2363 (citing Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), and
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971)).
65. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 419-20 (1944); Amalgamated Meat Cut-
ters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 743, 746-47 (D.D.C. 1971).
66. "Except as a legislative history informs an analysis of legislative action, there
is no more advance assurance that a legislative body will act by conscientiously applying
consistent standards than there is with respect to voters." 96 S. Ct. at 2363 n.10.
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nated the very rationale relied on by the 1939 Court in distinguishing
the Currin procedure from that held unconstitutional in Carter.7
Furthermore, since the Currin facts suggested judicial approval of the
supervised imposition of restraints, the apparent removal of the super-
vision requirement with respect to a city-wide referendum procedure
suggests that neither the imposition nor the waiver of land use
restraints by referendum is constitutionally infirm. That is to say, the
imposition-waiver distinction drawn in Cusack is overruled. 8
The Court, however, did not overrule Cusack. Instead, the impo-
sition-waiver distinction was recited,69 with Chief Justice Burger con-
cluding that plaintiff in Eastlake, like plaintiff in Cusack, was seeking
the waiver of a preexisting restraint: "No existing rights are being
impaired; new use rights are being sought from the City Council.
Thus, this case involves an owner seeking approval of a new use free
from the restrictions attached to the land when it was acquired.""0
Cusack, however, did not approve of referenda as appropriate devices
for the removal of land use restraints, but only of neighborhood
decisionmaking by "the persons who are to be most affected by such
modification." 7' Acceptance of the Cusack holding in toto, therefore,
would seemingly require that the Eubank criticism of "narrow" dele-
gations (i.e., neighborhood preferences) be held inapplicable to the
Eastlake facts.
Instead, the majority distinguished -the Eubank neighborhood pref-
erence concept in upholding the Eastlake referendum procedure .7
2
The Court thus ignored not only the imposition-waiver distinction it had
just drawn from Cusack, but also the interrelationship of the Eubank
and Cusack rationales.
In support of the neighborhood preference-referendum dichotomy
that it invoked from Eubank (despite the contrary language in Cusack),
67. See text accompanying notes 43-53 supra.
68. See text accompanying notes 35-41 supra.
69. 96 S. Ct. at 2364 n.12; see text accompanying nole 37 supra.
70. 96 S. Ct. at 2364 n.13. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens implicitly
attacked the vitality of Cusack by arguing that the requirements of due process attach
to the rezoning process with equal force whether additional restraint or additional free-
dom is at issue. Id. at 2367. See also Note, Zoning-Due Process-The Adjudicative
Decision Inherent in Tract Rezoning Requires the Decision-Maker to Adhere to Stand-
ards of Minimal Due Process, 8 GA. L. REv. 254, 262 (1973).
71. 242 U.S. at 531; see note 38 supra.
72. "Mhe standardless delegation of power to a limited group of property owners
condemned by the Court in Eubank and Roberge is not to be equated with decisionmak-
ing by the people through the referendum process." 96 S. Ct. at 2364.
526 [Vol. 55
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the Court quoted first from SASSO, 73 and then from James v. Valtierra74
the latter as a confirmation by the Court of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals decision in SASSO.75 In Valtierra, the United States Su-
preme Court upheld a provision of the California Constitution that
required a referendum on all proposed low rent public housing pro-
jects.76  However, the Eastlake Court's reliance on Valtierra is inap-
propriate, because plaintiffs in Valtierra challenged the California
provision on equal protection, not due process, grounds. Furthermore,
in so construing the Valtierra opinion the Court overlooked two im-
portant distinctions between the facts of Eastlake on the one hand and
Valtierra on the other. The language in the latter case approving
community-wide policy making was supported by a record demon-
strating that the rezoning would have an economic impact on the com-
munity at large.77 Furthermore, the mandatory referendum procedure
challenged in Valtierra was limited to a certain class of projects.7" The
scope of the impact of plaintiff's rezoning request in Eastlake was not
similarly supported in the record. 9 In addition, the Eastlake procedure
was applicable to all requests for rezoning by amendment of the compre-
hensive plan."
The majority nevertheless concluded that plaintiff's particular re-
zoning request "would likely" have an impact similar to that held
sufficient to sustain the Valtierra referendum." However, the Court
neither explicitly required such a finding nor limited the operation of
the referendum procedure to instances in which such a finding could
be made.8 2 The result is a circular due process analysis suggesting a
judicial reverence not heretofore apparent for the use of referenda in
land use planning: the referendum is held superior to the neighbor-
hood preference concept because it provides for community-wide
73. "'A referendum, however, is far more than an expression of ambiguously
founded neighborhood preference. It is the city itself legislating through its voters
. '" Id. (quoting Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union City, 424 F.2d
291,294 (9th Cir. 1970)).
74. A referendum "'ensures that all the people of a community will have a voice
in a decision which may lead to large expenditures of local governmental funds for in-
creased public services .... .' 96 S. Ct. at 2364 (quoting James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
137, 143 (1971)) (emphasis added by Court).
75. See note 73 supra.
76. 402 U.S. 137, 139 &n.2 (1971).
77. Id. at 143 n.4.
78. Id. at 139 n.2.
79. 96 S. Ct. at 2368 n.10 (dissent).
80. See note 12 supra.
81. 96 S. Ct. at 2362 n.7; see Note, supra note 21, at 178.
82. 96 S. Ct. at 2371 (dissent).
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policy making, and since community-wide policy making is involved, the
referendum is an appropriate device.
The missing logical step-that the particular question at hand is
one amenable to community-wide policy making-is provided, the
Court reasoned, by the Ohio court's determination that rezoning by
amendment is "legislative" in nature.8 3  This adherence to the label
affixed by the state court was attacked by Justice Stevens as an abro-
gation of the Court's responsibility to pursue an independent analysis
of the application of federal constitutional safeguards. 4  It has been
suggested by others that the labelling of rezoning requests as "legis-
lative," "administrative" or "adjudicative" by state courts is a matter
of form that does not correspond with either the prospective impact
of the requested rezoning or the kinds of information to which the deci-
sionmaker should be exposed.85 Indeed, the Court's reluctance to ignore
the legislative label appears to be contrary to accepted methods of due
process analysis in other contexts: "In the assessment, apportionment
and collection of taxes upon property within their jurisdiction the
Constitution of the United States imposes few restrictions upon the
States. In the enforcement of such restrictions as the Constitution does
impose this court has regarded substance and not form."8 6 The failure
of the Court in Eastlake similarly to disregard form and analyze the
primary activity involved, i.e., rezoning by amendment of a compre-
hensive plan, leaves the protection afforded to individual property
owners by the due process clause wholly dependent on the formalities
of state zoning law.
The reluctance of the Court to come to grips with the due process
problems associated with the use of mandatory referenda in land use
planning is disappointing for two reasons. First, the Eastlake opinion
leaves open the possibility of subsequent litigation of the same due
process issue, particularly if the claim arises in a state whose consti-
tution will not provide the judicial refuge so readily accepted in this
case. Second, counsel who relitigate the Eastlake due process issue
83. Id. at 2362.
84. Id. at 2368 (dissent).
85. See Comment, Zoning Amendments-The Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial
Action, 33 OHIo ST. L.J. 130, 133 (1972). See generally Comment, supra note 1.
86. Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385 (1908) (emphasis added). For exam-
ples of similar analyses that look to the substance of the activity in question, see Bi-
Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915); Powelton
Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 829 (E.D. Pa. 1968). See also




must again contend with the conflicting case law, having received little
guidance from the Court.
Such litigation, however, may be ill advised. In failing to provide
a clearer due process approach, the Court has left unscathed the sepa-
rate due process tests already enumerated. In the broad approval of
the Eastlake procedure by comparison to the procedure upheld in
Valtierra, the Court has strongly suggested that, if required, one or
more of the tests will be utilized to defeat such a challenge.
Litigation resources may be more fruitfully expended by chal-
lenging such referenda on state law grounds. One approach would be
to challenge the characterization of rezoning by plan amendment as
legislative. If a different characterization is adopted by the state court,
the state constitution may prohibit the application of referenda. Al-
ternatively, referenda may be attacked as contrary to the spirit of con-
sistent decisionmaking, if not the letter of procedural requirements,
found in state zoning enabling legislation.
8 7
If federal law is to be invoked, the issue may perhaps be framed
more appropriately in terms of the deprivation of a meaningful hearing
when a referendum is required, rather than in terms of the reasona-
bleness of the referendum provision as an exercise of the police power.
It must be noted, however, that a Supreme Court majority recently
decided not to hear an appeal in one case" that would have challenged
rezoning by initiative as a denial of such procedural due process re-
quirements.89 Nevertheless, Justice White's desire to hear that appeal,
together with the frequent allusions of the three dissenting Justices in
Eastlake to deprivations of "fundamental fairness" and especially with
the willingness of Justices Stevens and Brennan to declare tract rezoning
an adjudicative function on federal law grounds, suggests that at least
four members of the Court may be willing to reconsider a procedural
due process claim when an appropriate case arises.
JAMES H. GUTERMAN
87. See, e.g., Township of Sparta v. Spillane, 125 N.J. Super. 519, 525-26, 312 A.2d
154, 157-58 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973); Elkind v. City of New Rochelle, 5 Misc. 2d
296, 301-02, 163 N.Y.S.2d 870, 876-77 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 5
N.Y.2d 836, 181 N.Y.S.2d 509, 155 N.E.2d 404 (1958). But see Johnston v. City of
Claremont, 312 P.2d 300, 304-05 (1957), vacated on other grounds, 49 Cal. 2d 826,
323 P.2d 71 (1958). See generally authorities cited note 85 supra.
88. San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d
570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974), appeal dismissed, 96 S. Ct. 3184 (1976) (Brennan,
White, JJ., dissenting).
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